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Abstrakt
Práce je zaměřena na autentizační systém Kerberos a jeho správu, převážne v oblasti Keytab
souborů. Práce popisuje základní součásti celého systému, které jsou v těchto operacích
zapojeny, a jejich hlavní vlastnosti. Částečně je také popsán administrační systém FreeIPA,
jenž pro autentizaci uživatelů Kerberos využívá. Hlavním cílem bylo vytvořit aplikaci
schopnou automaticky a bez uživatelova přičinění rotovat klíče Kerbera a zvýšit tak úroveň
zabezpečení celého systému pro případy odposlechů komunikace.
Abstract
This thesis is focused on the Kerberos authentication system and itsmanagement, primarily
in the area of the Keytab files. The thesis describes the basic components of the whole
system which are involved in these operations and their main properties. The FreeIPA
administration system is partly described as well. It uses the Kerberos for the users’
authentication. The main objective of this work was to develop an application capable of
,automatically and without user’s effort, rotation of the Kerberos keys and thus enhance
the security level of the whole system in cases of the communication eavesdropping.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In a world in which the total of human knowledge is doubling about every ten years, our security
can rest only on our ability to learn
Kevin Mitnick
Information technologies are undoubtedly one of the fastest growing areas of human
knowledge. If the Internet ever reached such an extension, its breakdown would cause the
global collapse. Nowadays, it is starting to be very important for us to have all of our
computer data and running services accessible from wherever we are. We also need to feel
secure that nobody can compromise our communication because we transport our whole
life on it, our work and privacy, all through the network hoping that nobody would get
hold of it and the information is safe there.
To provide secure enviroment for such tasks, we can use many ways of user authentica-
tion, development of one of them started in early 1980s. It’s called Kerberos and despite the
original intention to use as educational network protocol, it evolved into general purpose
security system.
Kerberos is authentication system allowing secure access to remote resources on unse-
cured network. As a big advantage is considered used session method, where user is required
to prove his identity just once per session. Whole system is postponing use of passwords
to the background and is introducing system of tickets. All communications between two
issued parties are highly dependend of time marks all requests are issued by tickets.
In chapter 2, Kerberos basics will be described. Objective is to gather essential in-
formation about whole project, to discuss all entities involved in communication and its
protocol. Concept and distribution of Kerberos ticket will be explained as well as princi-
ples of encrypting. Mainly the creation and use of keytab files will be described. Besides
introduction to whole functionality, the FreeIPA project is also briefly metioned as it uses
Kerberos for authentication, and following chapter’s development was based on it.
Chapter 3 will be devoted to development of application, discussing techniques used to
achieve specified goal, automatic rotation of Kerberos keys.
Conclusion of this thesis and development will be stated in chapter 4.
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Chapter 2
Kerberos
Kerberos is secure, single-sign-on, trusted, third-party mutual authentication service[2], at
the time of creating this document in version 5. If we look at the whole definition, it seems
slightly complicated, the meaning of its parts is as follows:
• secure
kerberos never stores or uses user’s passwords in an open format, even if prompted
for password, it is immediately hashed and discarded. As described further, whole
communication is coded by the so-called keys.
• single-sign-on
commonly used as the abbreviation SSO, which means that to use all services and
resources provided by network, the user must prove himself to the Authentication
Server (2.7.2) only once per session.
• trusted third-party
means that every authentication request between two different parts of the Kerberos
network is managed by the centralized server.
• mutual authentication
at the one-way authentication services, a user only proves his identity towards the con-
tacted server, at the mutual authentication based services, the server is also required
to assure the client about their true identity.
If all these factors are regarded, we get the whole system, which is very robust and
quite resistant. We are always assured that communication takes place between two trusted
parties if the server is not physically compromised, and as it will be described further, even
those cases are hard to reach[11].
This system and protocol was named Kerberos. The name comes from the Greek mythol-
ogy, where Cerberus, Hades’ three-headed monstrous dog was watching over the gates of
the underworld preventing souls from escape. Besides the name, there is also a resemblance
in the fact how many heads Cerberus had. Number three is mentioned in Kerberos quite
often, the whole system is based on the three main pillars, as described further (2.2), also
the Kerberos’ central server consists of three parts.
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2.1 History
In 1983 a consortium formed by MIT1, IBM2 and DEC3 launched a project Athena, the
academic educational distributed computing enviroment. In order to provide the secure
authentication for the use of the services accesible through the project Athena, MIT started
developing the Kerberos protocol. From the versions 1 to 3, Kerberos was meant just for
the use inside of Athena, but since the time of the version 4, which was released in 1987, it
has been distributed publicly. In 1992 the American universities started using the Kerberos
4 on their networks. This mass expansion was the main reason to keep the backward
compatibility in Kerberos 5[15].
In 1993 Kerberos V5 and GSS-API (2.5) complete specifications were released[16][3]
and development of V5 started. Kerberos 5 version 1.0 was released in 1996. Currently,
Kerberos has been still in the version 5 and for now, there are no official plans to remake it
into V6. Since the time of version 4 Kerberos has been distributed under the Free software
foundations GNU/GPL4.
Figure 2.1: MIT Kerberos historical logo, three dobberman heads watching over[10].
Since the cancellation of the project Athena in 1991, Kerberos’ development continued
inside MIT, until 2007, when the Kerberos Consortium was founded. Since then the de-
velopment has become sponsored by many universities and retailers[8]. MIT, Microsoft,
Oracle, RedHat, Fidelity investments, NetApp and Nippon telephone and telegraph are the
members of the executive advisory board.
Figure 2.2: MIT Kerberos consortium logo[8].
In 1996 fork of Kerberos was created, it was developed in Sweden and called Heimdal
Kerberos - it was named after the norse mythical god Heimdallr, who was guarding the
seat of gods in Asgard. Heimdal Kerberos is based on the MIT Kerberos V5 and contains
a different set of utilities than the MIT Kerberos but it still provides the compatibility and
support for the MIT Kerberos.
1Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2International Business Machines
3Digital Equipment Corporation
4GNU General Public License
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From this point, whenever Kerberos is mentioned, the MIT’s implementation is meant
unless stated otherwise.
2.2 Protocol
Three heads of Cerberus might represent three pillars of Kerberos system
• Client
• Key Distribution Center
• Kerberized Services
Client
As a client, one entity, typically endpoint terminal initiating connection with kerberized
services via KDC is ment.
Kerberized service
Application running on specified machine modified to work under Kerberos communication
principles. Typical representatives are directory servers, mailservers, network file systems,
webservers.
A common situation occurs when a client wants to use one of the kerberized services. To
maintain the connection secured, the encryption keys for communication must be delivered
to them. This is achieved throught the Key Distribution Center which acts as a trusted
third party as mentioned before. Kerberos uses symmetric keys, thus it must use a protocol
for its secure distribution - Needham-Schroeder Symmetric Key Protocol.
2.2.1 Needham-Schroeder Symmetric Key Protocol
It is one of the two protocols created by authors Roger Needham and Michael Schroeder.
Objective of this protocol is to distribute freshly created shared symmetric session key
between two attending parties. When both parties have obtained the key, it is used to
encrypt their further communication through the unsecured network. Kerberos uses this
protocol specification to provide the ticket exchange.
Protocol specification
1. Client sends authentication request to KDC. It contains only the client’s principal (not
the password or the principal’s key) and is pointed towards Authentication Server for
review.
2. Authentication Server checks the database if client is credible to acquire Ticket Grant-
ing Ticket and if so, the client is issued with an encrypted TGT and a session key for
Ticket Granting Server. To decrypt the TGS session key the principal’s key is used,
TGT is encrypted by the TGS’ private key, so only TGS is able to decrypt it.
3. Client chooses service to request, contacts TGS with provided TGT and ID of de-
manded service. Client also creates authenticator which consists of a timestamp and
7
Client
KDC
Kerberized service
Ticket-Granting
Server
Authentication
Server
1
2
3
4
5
6
.
request(principal)
{TGT}TGS_K
{Cli/TGS_K}principal_K
TGT(service)
{time,principal}Cli/TGS_K
{Cli/Srv Ticket}SRV_K
{Cli/Srv_K}Cli/TGS_K
{Cli/Srv Ticket}SRV_K
{time,principal}Cli/Srv_K
{time}Cli/Srv_K
Figure 2.3: Needham-Schroeder Symmetric Key Protocol presented on Kerberos system
a client’s principal. The authenticator is encrypted by the Ticket Granting Server’s
private key.
4. If the request meets the requirements, TGT generates a client/service ticket for the
specific service, and encrypts it using the service key. TGS also generates a clien-
t/service session key, which, encrypted by the client/TGS session key, also sends to
the client.
5. Client decrypts the received message using its session key then it encrypts the newly
created authenticator towards service and together with the service ticket it presents
itself to the demanded service.
6. The Service server decrypts the received messages and if it is successful, it updates
the received time and, encrypted by the client/service key, replies to the client.
At this point, both the client and the server have keys and tickets required for further
communication. As we can see, along with the classic Needham-Schroeder, Kerberos adds
timestamps to improve the security of connection. It also means that all entities in kerber-
ized network should have synchronized computer clock. This is usually achieved by NTP5
server running on an open port of the KDC’s machine and other machine’s synchronization
server primarily set on this one.
5Network Time Protocol
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2.2.2 Pre-Authentication
Kerberos also introduces a method of Pre-Authentication, to reinforce the security and
prevent, or at least make brute force attacks more difficult. The thing is, when the client
initiates connection, its request is a simple plain text message containing principal, a service
to use (in this case krbtgt it means the kerbero ticket granting ticket service), ip addresses
and a timestamp. As a reply, the client recieves the TGS session key encrypted by the prin-
cipal’s key. This could be exploited if the attacker requests several TGTs and using brute
force if it tries to extract the principal’s encryption key. For this reason, Pre-Authentication
was brought up, because the compatibility with Kerberos 4 is kept as an option, but it is
highly recommended to use it, when no backward compatibility is needed.
Client establishing a connection to KDC with the enabled pre-authentication sends a
request as stated before, but Authentication Server replies with an error packet instead of
TGT and a session key. User is then prompted for a password (or a key in the automated
case) to use it to encrypt a timestamp, which is resent to AS. By decripting it using the
known key from the database and the timestamp being in a specified time window, the
trusted identity of principal is then either confirmed or disproved.
2.2.3 Replay cache
To prevent situation when a possible attacker gets an authenticator and a ticket from a
communication between a client and a service server, which could be used for a replay at-
tack, Kerberos uses replay cache. Since authenticator’s lifetime is limited for two minutes,
it would not be easy to forge such attack, however still possible. Therefore, all application
servers (meaning Service servers and Ticket Granting server) store the authenticators re-
cieved in the last two minutes so it could deny a connection from any duplicates. Therefore
only way to a compromise communication is a physical man in the middle of whom it would
result into the principal without the service access, thus warning of a probable detection of
an imposter.
2.3 Entities
In this section, all terms and parts of Kerberos involved will be described in its basic
functionality.
2.3.1 Realm
As a Realm, enclosed set of clients, serices and KDC in typically one domain space is
considered. Realm is also an alias for the address of a machine where the kerberos database
is stored, this is usually the same machine KDC runs on, but it can be outsourced. Realm
is in a format DOMAIN.NAME, realm name is recommended to be the same as the machine’s
domain name, but in the upper-case notation, to distinguish it from any service addresses.
2.3.2 Principal
Kerberos principal stands for a username, in case of a user, or a kerberized service name.
All entities included in every instance of kerberos must have its unique principal because it
is used to grant the kerberos tickets. There are three types of the kerberos principals:
9
• user@EXAMPLE.COM
• user/instance@EXAMPLE.COM
• host/service.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM
User principal
User principal identifies one end user towards kerberos realm. It is used for authentication
to KDC and for retrieving the initial tickets.
Instance principal
Instance expands the principal’s rights. Users can usually have an instance called admin
which is used to administrate the kerberos database. For logging in and the security pur-
poses it is recommended not to use the initial administrator’s principal for modifications
but only to distribute the admin instances towards the other responsible principals and
handle the administration operations by them.
Host/Service principal
Since every machine in Kerberos network must have a principal, also hosts and services
have one. They are in a format where the keyword host (for accessing the host machine)
or a service name is followed by a slash and a complete domain name of a machine.
2.4 Keys and salt
To maintain a higher level of security, the pricipal’s password is not stored anywhere in the
open format. This is achieved by the use of keys and salts.
2.4.1 Key
Key is computed by a kerberos function string2key of a given string and a chosen encryp-
tion type[13][12]. Kerberos 5 supports the following encryption types:
Kerberos encryption type Cipher Cipher mode Key length Auth. code
aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 AES CBC+CTS 256 bits SHA-1 96-bits
aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 AES CBC+CTS 128 bits SHA-1 96-bits
rc4-hmac RC4 128 bits SHA-1 96-bits
des3-cbc-sha1 3DES CBC 168 bits SHA-1 96-bits
des-cbc-crc DES CBC 56 bits CRC 32-bit
Figure 2.4: Kerberos 5 encryption types
Because string2key is a hash function, except a brute force, there is no way to deter-
mine a password encrypted in the given key. Generated key is therefore safe to use through
network and there is no comparison among passwords. As stated before, a password is not
saved in the open form if the user authenticates himself towards the authentication server.
The entered password with concatenated salt is locally generated to a key which is then
compared with the saved key (not password) on the server’s site.
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2.4.2 Salt
Kerberos introduced a password salt in version 5. Salt, in this context, represents string
added after unencrypted password, to generate truly unique key for each password and used
salt type. This is to ensure that two users of the same realm who happen to pick the same
password will not have same key generated. Currently, there are following types of salt :
• normal
defaultly used by Kerberos, salt is the whole principal (e.g. user@EXAMPLE.COM)
• v4
salt is not used at all. This is in order to maintain backward compatibility with
Kerberos 4 which does not use salt.
• norealm
salt is just principal’s username
• onlyrealm
only realm name is used as salt, kept only for compatibility because its use denies
the concept of salt - string attached to a password is the same for all the realm’s
principals
• afs3
used for compatibility with AFS6 in Kerberos 4
• special
refers to the string stored in the database which is used as salt
2.5 GSSAPI
An abbreviation for Generic Security Services Application Programming Interface[5][17].
As the name suggests, it is not a set protocol of the specific methods providing message
format for authentication encapsulation. It aims on developers to create the GSSAPI com-
pliant libraries with the specific protocol definitions but they are using provided GSSAPI
interface for higher interoperability. Kerberos 5 API is covered under GSSAPI[4].
2.6 SASL
Simple Authentication and Security Layer is framework[7] for adding or upgrading authenti-
cation level in client/server protocols. Theoretically allows any SASL supported mechanism
to be used with any protocol using SASL.
2.7 KDC
Needham-Schroeder protocol uses trusted server for distribution of shared secrets, in case
of Kerberos the server is called KDC which is short for Key Distribution Center. KDC
itself handles all of the ticket requests and flows and although it is usually only one process,
it can be logically divided into three parts:
6Andrew File System
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• Credentials Database
• Authentication Server
• Ticket Granting Server
It is usual, that in larger or more crucial kerberized networks, more than one instance
of KDC is running, primary and synchronized backup, both on separate machines.
2.7.1 Database
The database contents are protected by the encryption of the whole database by the kerberos
administrator’s key, even the backup instances and the database dumps. This method
secures the stored information even in the event of a physical security breach to the KDC
machine. In its initial form, MIT Kerberos uses its own database on KDC to store the
required information. However, its possible and also widely used, to mantain the database
by another service, such as the LDAP7 directories. This way was used in the FreeIPA project
where MIT Kerberos is used for authentication and 389 Directory Server [14] (formerly
known as Fedora Directory Server) as the credentials database. If default MIT kerberos
database system is used, its content is modified and controlled by basic utility kadmin.
2.7.2 Authentication Server
When client initiates communication with KDC without valid TGT, then it contacts the
Authentication Server. Depending on a type of the authentication, client uses either the
keytab-based initialization, or it is prompted for a password. After successful authentication
towards KDC, AS creates a new valid TGT which is encrypted by given key and sent to
client.The decrypted ticket is then stored in a credentials cache and then used automatically
to prove client when requesting tickets for accessing offered kerberized services. This largely
simplifies the whole process, since the client does not need to prove himself for every ticket
requested.
2.7.3 Ticket Granting Server
Shortened as TGS, the Ticket Granting Server processes requests for tickets to access ker-
berized services in current realm. Clients contact TGS by presenting valid TGT acquired
from Authentication Server and principal of service which they demand to use. If the
client’s TGT is validated as authentic, client is issued with a ticket for specified service in
order with the stated server policies.
2.7.4 Tickets
Kerberos uses the so-called tickets for the authentication. The tickets are essentially en-
crypted information about principal’s current session. Ticket contains various information,
the most important are principal, session key and timestamp determining ticket’s window
of valid use. To connect and use resources of host or service, user is required to present
itself with a valid ticket. This is managed through KDC.
The first ticket recieved after a successfull initialization to KDC is ticket-granting ticket
which is timestamped information encrypted by the user’s password or key (depending on
7Lightweight Database Access Protocol
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used pre-authentication method). Until expiration, the principal uses this ticket to contact
the ticket granting service for other tickets used specifically for contacting and making use
of the kerberized services. Ticket itself can be specifically flagged.
• INITIAL Identifies Ticket Granting Ticket.
• HW-AUTHENT Hardware device was used for authentication, for example smart card or
encrypted USB key.
• PRE-AUTHENT When KDC is using pre-authentication.
• INVALID As name suggests, means invalid ticket, which must be firstly revalidated.
• RENEWABLE Tickets with this flag have two endtimes, initial and terminal, where until
time of terminal occurs, ticket can be renewed automatically and without valid TGT.
• PROXIABLE Flag allowing ticket to be used through proxy server, thus request from
ticket with different network address than set.
• FORWARDABLE Higher level of PROXIABLE flag, allowing even TGT to be proxiable.
Client’s tickets are stored in a ticket cache. In the kerberos terminology it is called
credentials cache (or shortly ccache). As the name may suggest the use of memory block
for cached tickets, for higher portability of the authentication system, MIT Kerberos stores
cache in a single file specified by its configuration. Besides the default location of cache,
client can create multiple other cache files for separate activities which are mostly used by
the user’s automated procedures and scripts.
It should be mentioned that some of the other implementations of kerberos, such as
Microsoft and Apple, have credentials cache stored in memory, not a file. This is for
higher security purposes. Even if a possible attacker got to the running machine with an
active kerberos cache, he would not get a hold of the stored tickets without the advanced
memory mapping tools and techniques. Although this might be considered as an advantage,
portability of such method is far more limited than caching into a file.
$ klist -cfe
Ticket cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_0
Default principal: user@EXAMPLE.COM
Valid starting Expires Service principal
04/28/12 18:58:26 04/29/12 18:58:26 krbtgt/EXAMPLE.COM@EXAMPLE.COM
Flags: FIA , Etype (skey , tkt): aes256 -cts -gmac -sha1 -96,
aes256 -cts -gmac -sha1 -96
04/28/12 18:59:42 04/29/12 18:58:26 ldap/i.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM
Flags: FIA , Etype (skey , tkt): aes256 -cts -gmac -sha1 -96,
aes256 -cts -gmac -sha1 -96
Figure 2.5: klist credentials (ticket) cache output
In the previous figure2.5, we can see an example output of a basic kerberos utility klist.
Following major information is displayed for this very case:
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• Ticket cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc 0
location of actually used credentials cache file
• Default principal: user@EXAMPLE.COM principal of current ccache, one cache can
have only one principal active
Following this basic information, we can see two entries of the active tickets. The
first one, krbtgt/EXAMPLE.COM@EXAMPLE.COM, is previously described ticket-granting ticket
and it allows the user to retrieve service specific tickets. From the name of the second
ticket and the knowledge about principals from section 2.3.2, we can tell that shown ticket
ldap/i.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM provides access to LDAP service running on machine
behind domain name i.example.com.
Both tickets have validation timestamps. TGT is obviously aquired before the LDAP
ticket and although both tickets are in this configuration set to have duration of 24 hours,
the LDAP ticket is of slightly shorter duration. This is given by the Kerberos policy that
none of other tickets can exceed duration of TGT.
2.8 Keytab
The term keytab has caught on for many services as a file holding user’s login information
in some form, to automate or simplify the authentication towards given service. For sim-
plification, the kerberos keytab defines itself as a file containing pairs of kerberos principals
and their corresponding keys. In reality it is a little more complicated than that, so if we
look closely at the inner structure of the kerberos keytab files, they are basically a list (or
array) of the so-called keytab entries. Each entry consists of the following parts:
• VNO
Also referred as KVNO - Key Version Number. For each change of the user’s password
or an update of the key block, KVNO is incremented and the change is logged. If
more than one entry with the identical principal exists, the authentication goes from
a key with the highest VNO because it is most likely to be updated last and therefore
it would probably work. Entries with the lower KVNOs are kept in a keytab for
compatibility with attached services since there might be certain delay before service
obtains a client’s new key from KDC after its update.
• principal
kerberos principal in the same meaning as stated in 2.3.2.
• timestamp
because the kerberos’ authentication system is highly based on the limited time win-
dows for actions and time itself, each keytab entry’s time of creation is stored. It
can be used in various user scripts but the main reason for storing this information
is that the client can check itself when it was the last time it obtained the new key
and therefore it can get the new keys in its own direction.
• encoding type
each credential can be hashed by different encoding type because not every kerberized
service has to necessarily support all of the kerberos-used encodings. Also each type
of encoding consumes different amount of computation time, thus optimalizations for
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the lower risk services can be specified. Service’s list of supported encoding types is
fully in control of its administrator.
• key
byte block of the generated key itself.
Keytabs in Kerberos are managed by provided utility ktutil. We can see an example
of the keytab creation process in figure 2.6
$ ktutil
ktutil: add_entry -password -p user@EXAMPLE.COM -k 1
-e aes256 -cts -hmac -sha1 -96
Password for user@EXAMPLE.COM:
ktutil: add_entry -password -p user@EXAMPLE.COM -k 1
-e aes128 -cts -hmac -sha1 -96
Password for user@EXAMPLE.COM:
... # repeated for all demanded encryption types
ktutil: write_kt user.keytab
Figure 2.6: ktutil creating a keytab
Each line command creates a key from the user’s password (prompted after executing),
a principal and a specified encryption type. Those keys are held in memory until command
to write this keytab into a file, executed by write kt followed by a file name. With this file,
user is no longer prompted for a password, since all needed keys are stored. It also means
anybody with access to this file can authenticate himself to a given realm not knowing a
passphrase but only using this keytab. Therefore it is highly recommended to log access to
all user’s keytabs instead of just setting the correct read permissions.
ktutil is used to manage keys in a keytab, for example adding, removing, modifying.
Previously mentioned utility klist with different switches is used to just list through
contents of the keytab.
$ klist -kte user.keytab
Keytab name: WRFILE :/home/user/keytabs/user.keytab
KVNO Timestamp Principal
---- ----------------- ------------------------------------------
7 04/28/12 18:53:22 user@EXAMPLE.COM (aes256 -cts -hmac -sha1 -96)
8 04/28/12 18:53:22 user@EXAMPLE.COM (aes128 -cts -hmac -sha1 -96)
... # following all keys in keytab
Figure 2.7: klist keytab output
As demonstrated in 2.7, by having read rights on the keytab file, it gives us access to
the user’s principal and a used type of encryption which, for some algorithms, could be
used to backtrack the used long-term key which could be used for some form of the subtle
attack on the infrastructure.
15
2.9 FreeIPA
Meaning Identity, Policy, Audit, FreeIPA are the open-source integrated security informa-
tion management solution[1]. It uses MIT Kerberos to handle the authentication procedures
as intended but instead of the original file as a database, FreeIPA uses LDAP directory,
specifically 389 Directory Server.
The access rights of the user entry in LDAP are delegated throught the whole FreeIPA
system, thus all operations are based on LDAP lookups. To understand the way, FreeIPA
combines Kerberos with LDAP, only information model is essential.
2.9.1 LDAP Information model
Information model of LDAP directory is defined by the used data types and basic entities
for storing information, so- called entries. An entry is a set of attributes of described
object. Each attribute has a name and a stored value. Information model is therefore used
to describe structure of the information stored into the directory. The system administrator
can completely define a form of this structure by its intended purpose. Concept object class
is introduced - what is meant is a set of objects with the same characteristics, almost the
same as a class in the class-oriented languages in the object-oriented programming but it
specifies the object’s location inside of the tree. This is provided by OID8 which is a row
of the decimal numbers uniquely identifying an object, for example (and used in rotation
library) OID 2.16.840.1.113730.3.8.10.1 provides the location of the held object user’s
key in FreeIPA LDAP.
2.9.2 Administering FreeIPA
FreeIPA thus does not use kadmin its database for administration but instead, the utility
ipa is provided to control all matters kadmin does, and many more through the IPA
capabilities.
FreeIPA also enhances protection against a password attack. Even if the pre-authentication
is enabled and thus the attacker is very limited to acquire hashed message, there is still a
small chance. Logging of an event of the multiple authentications without any proven use
is then logged and eventually blocking of the user’s attempts might occur, in accordance
with the set policies.
FreeIPA also slightly upgrades the Kerberos password policy where originally no limi-
tations were specified, at least the length of password and an expiration is set. This is to
make the decryption of the possibly caught message harder.
8Object Identifier
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Chapter 3
Rotation
Even though the whole Kerberos system is quite robust and secure against possible attacks,
the more energy we spend on keeping something secret, the more energy somebody else
spends on trying to find a way how to get into it. Kerberos uses pre-authentication, replay
cache, password expiration and the most importantly the trusted server, however, there is
slight possibility to collect enough network traffic from one user to eventually acquire his
encryption key. To prevent this, we can set the password expiration policy, as mentioned
before, but it requires the user’s interaction, which, in a wrong moment, might compromise
the user’s work.
Since Kerberos is widely used also for its comfort of using keytabs and not bothering
with the typical authentication service logins, the users are even more repeled from the
manually updating keytabs, so advantage of Kerberos is slightly compromising the whole
system. A chain is only as strong as its weakest link, so if this part is the Kerberos’ weakest
link, it has to be reinforced.
The idea here is to create a set of utilities to completely automate rotation of the keytab
keys without the need of the user’s intervention. We can split this goal into these following
parts:
• Library
• Daemon
• Utility (command-line)
Division into those parts is purely logical and happens to end up as three units, no
resemblance with three heads intended.
3.1 Library
Each program library should provide a complete set of operations to achieve a certain goal.
In this case, we need to refresh keys in the provided keytab. This can be pointed out as a
non-divisible task which resulted in a function ipa krot taking care of a single rotation by
given parameters.
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3.1.1 ipa krot
Function is declared as krb5 error code type which equals to the functions accessible
in Kerberos API. When rotation is successful, function returns EXIT SUCCESSFUL value,
otherwise it delegates the Kerberos error code obtained from the used API functions.
Rotation function uses five following arguments, although for successful rotation, only
first one is required.
• [in] char *kr path
Path to the keytab designed to rotate should be given in absolute, however relative
path is also acceptable.
• [in] char *kr principal
If not specified, default principal is used. This given character string is used for
building a kerberos principal structure and can be passed in a complete form (e.g.
user@EXAMPLE.COM), or shortened only to the prinicpal’s username (e.g. user).
• [in] char *kr realm
If not specified, default realm is used.
• [out] int *nentries
Pointer to an integer value used for returning number of the successfully rotated keys.
If set NULL together with following entries, all rotated keys are immidiatelly removed
from the keytab. If both pointers are valid, deprecated keys stay in the keytab and
handling of their existence is moved to the higher level.
• [out] krb5 keytab entry *entries
Pointer to begin the strucures array to be allocated and then used for passing the
deprecated keytab entries back to a parent program.
3.1.2 Kerberos API
Kerberos provides an extensive application interface[9] with a high level of abstraction for
developers to use. The whole interface is too complicated and does not need to be described
because it is prepared for the kerberizing services but the description of the basic elements
and groups of functions used in the library design is necessary to understand.
krb5 context
Context wraps all Kerberos specific global variables for process. Even though it is possible
to have more contexts active at one moment, it is not commonly used because it contradicts
the principles of the context itself.
krb5 principal
A structure holding the principal’s complete information in an encapsulated form. API
provides several functions of the principal structure creation and reading its data.
krb5 keytab, krb5 keytab entry
keytab provides a structure for manipulation its entries. Once keytab file is mapped,
functions for adding, removing and listing inside of entries are available.
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krb5 ccache
Memory representation of tickets cache,
3.1.3 Steps for rotation
To achieve the final state, which are the rotated keys written in a keytab and updated on
server, following steps need to take place and succeed:
• Initialize kerberos context
• Process realm and principal name
• Open keytab for reading and writing, map to structure
• Initialite to KDC using keytab
• Create temporary credentials cache, store recieved ticket
• Read keytab entries, for every matching to given realm and principal, generate new
random key
• Set new key to LDAP
• Write new keys to keytab
• Deallocate used resources, destroy temporary ccache
3.1.4 Key update
To set newly generated keys to FreeIPA directory, already existing function ldap set keytab
created by Simo Sorce1, is used. Because LDAP protocol uses BER2, firstly a control se-
quence for an upload is prepared with the BER library interface. This consists of simply
principal, encryption type and key itself. After successful preparation of the control se-
quence, connection to LDAP service is initialized and extended operation specified by a key
control and LDAP OID for setting keytab is executed. To succeed, LDAP returns message
in the form of LDAP OID of the successfully retrieved key. Binding towards LDAP is also
performed under GSSAPI.
To update users’ keys, one must be initialized to KDC and have TGT stored in the
credentials cache. Since the user might be using default credentials cache for other services
at the moment of rotation, process itself cannot interfere with it. Because of that, a
temporary credentials cache is set up and enviroment value KRB5CCNAME pointed to its
location. When requested for ticket while updating keys, temporary cache is used. After
successful update, KRBCCNAME is reset to the original value and temporary cache is destroyed.
3.2 Daemon
As linux conventions dictate[6], daemon is running on the background in an infinite loop.
When needed, daemons react on the messages sent through a chosen communication chan-
nel, usually dbus or pipes. There is no implementation on any interaction needed, therefore
daemon runs in infinite loop as shown on figure 3.1.
1ssorce@redhat.com
2Basic Encoding Rules - part of ASN.1 standard
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SIGTERM
Load configruation
Prepare database,locks
Wait grace
Remove keys
Update database
Wait TTL
Rotate keys
Update database
Failure?
Keys to remove?
Daemon started
Terminate
NO
NO
YES
YES
.
.
Figure 3.1: Daemon diagram
3.2.1 Configuration
Daemon configuration is loaded from ini file and parsed by the freely obtainable INI LI-
BRARY3 created by Dmitri Pal. This library provides access and listing through any given
configuration .ini file corresponding with its inner structure. For easier manipulation
inside of the program, file’s content is mapped on the open source structure collection4.
Structure of the configuration file is required as shown in figure 3.2. At this moment, for
each pair of keytab and principal, [section] entry is required.
Section
Each section is required to be uniquely named. This is because it is used as a key for storing
sections’ actual rotation status to the database. First three items of every section don’t
3packages libini config and libini config-devel
4packages libcollection and libcollection-devel
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[section]
file = /absolute/path/to/rotated.keytab
realm = REALM.NAME
principal = principal_name@REALM.NAME
ttl = [int]
grace = [int]
Figure 3.2: Daemon configuration file example - section
need to be analyzed, since their function is obvious from the name and the example values.
But following two items is crucial for the whole process of rotation.
• ttl
Well-known acronym for Time To Live, this item specifies how long each loop of
keytab rotation will take.
• grace
Or grace period. It defines for how long will the keytab contain both newly acquired
and deprecated keys. At this moment, user has to specify this information manually,
since now there is not any way to fill this value. This interval takes time that is
needed for KDC to distribute the update keys through network.
3.2.2 Storing information
If daemon is terminated after removing deprecated keys and before next rotation, its be-
havior depends simply on the information stored in a configuration file. But if termination
occurs in state, when deprecated keys are still in the keytab, daemon’s current state has to
be saved. For this purpose, use of a simple file would be complicated and also unnecessary
because user doesn’t need to modify anything.
3.2.3 BerkeleyDB
BerkeleyDB provides a simple database where string key associates byte array of data.
Daemon’s current state is defined whether some sections’ keys are to be removed and time
of next rotation. For the simpliest way of use, BDB provides two methods to call for the
accessing database. put() and get, where structure consisting of size and pointer is used
as both key and data. get() searches database by a given key and if not found, informing
value is returned, otherwise data structure is filled with block referenced by key. For storing
new data or overwriting data for the same key, the data and key structures are filled and
by calling put saved to database file. While storing simple data type, such as integer value
or character string, there is no special preparation, on retrieving it from database, data are
just masked by the data type cast. In case of storing data structure, like in the daemon
implementation, whole structure must be firstly transformed to the byte block and stored
with a calculated size. To read queried data we have to implement reciprocal function
masking byte block onto the specified structure.
On figure 3.3 structure of the information being stored into database is shown. The
structure data are serialized and divided into separate bytes, forming specific size long byte
array. On physical layer, BerkeleyDB are keys pointing to its data, therefore not a relational
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<integer> TIME
<integer> NENTRIES
<boolean> REMOVED
<krb5_keytab_entry> ENTRIES
.
.
.
.
NENTRIES * sizeof(krb5_keytab_entry)
ipa_section_entry
Figure 3.3: Data structure transfered to byte block for storin into dabatase
database. On successful search of key (converted to byte array with its size) in database,
pointer to memory and block size are returned, because key and data types are opaque to
BDB. Inner organization of BDB is shown on figure 3.4.
KEY_size KEY_data
KEY_size KEY_data
KEY_size KEY_data
DATA_size KEY_data
DATA_size KEY_data
DATA_size KEY_data
Figure 3.4: Inner structure of BerkeleyDB file
3.2.4 Threading
To cover rotation of multiple sections with different keytabs and time values by single
process would be very difficult and having techniques such as process forking and threads,
even unnecessary. Therefore, for each defined section daemon creates a single thread,
staying as a single process daemon with a high level of paralellism. Because each thread
uses the same code, it goes through a few critical sections requiring exclusive access.
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• Credentials cache system enviroment value set to temporary file
• Writing/removing entries in keytab file
• Storing data into database file
To be absolutely sure, none of the mentioned critical sections could be accessed in the
same time and thus creating risk of program failure, each of them is protected by a single
mutex lock shared between threads.
3.2.5 Termination
Because using any sort of communication with running daemon was evaluated as unneces-
sary, the signal handling was implemented. Daemon listens to the following signals:
• SIGTERM
• SIGQUIT
• SIGINT
These results into termination of daemon and freeing used resources. Other signals are
being ignored and just logged to syslog for analytical purposses
3.2.6 Logging
Since daemon is running in background, there is no use of the standard output messages
to inform the user about its activity. To provide this kind of information, syslog is used.
Reports are logged /var/log/messages under the daemon’s name, ipa krotd. Three levels
of syslog messages are used:
• LOG INFO - reports about daemon’s basic activity, e.g. keys rotated, deprecated keys
deleted
• LOG WARNING - on recieving unrecognised signal
• LOG ERROR - on database access failure, configuration parsing failure, and other kinds
of errors
3.2.7 Testing
Even though in common use it is expected to rotate keys approximately once a day with
grace period overlaying several minutes (hours tops), daemon was tested on much shorter
time values. When all sections have the same time, or on the other hand widely different
time values, situations when more threads are in the same code part might occur. To
simulate this behavior, ttl and grace values were set in order of the seconds and daemon
executed with six keytabs in configuration. When almost every second keytab was rotated
for more than two hours, and in the end all keytabs were valid and applicable for kinit
authentication towards KDC, daemon can be considered successful.
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May 1 20:51:55 ipa_krotd: daemon starting
May 1 20:51:55 ipa_krotd: keytab list loaded
May 1 20:51:55 ipa_krotd: threads initialized
May 1 20:51:55 ipa_krotd: section "2" rotation started , ttl: 20,
grace: 10
May 1 20:51:55 ipa_krotd: section "1" rotation started , ttl: 15,
grace: 7
May 1 20:51:55 ipa_krotd: section "2" deprecated keys removed
May 1 20:51:57 ipa_krotd: section "1" keys rotated
May 1 20:51:58 ipa_krotd: section "2" keys rotated
May 1 20:52:04 ipa_krotd: section "1" deprecated keys removed
May 1 20:52:07 ipa_krotd: recieved SIGTERM signal , terminating.
Figure 3.5: Example of syslog messages generated by daemon for behavior logging pur-
posses
3.3 Utility
Third part of Automatic Kerberos Key Rotation pack is command-line utility. It is based on
behavior of the daemon but from the recieved parameters it makes an immediate rotation
or deletion of the deprecated keys.
3.4 Further development
After approval, project will be added, distributed and updated via a fedorahosted system
and there is high probability of it being included in RedHat Enterprise Linux in future.
Although its current functionality meets the requirements, there is always room for im-
provement and expansion.
3.4.1 Principal filtering
First of the next expansions is to add functions for principals’ name filtering and use of the
regular expressions in it. At this point, a key rotation is based on the whole given name
of principal. For example, a section principal http/user@EXAMPLE.COM will rotate only the
key for user’s key to access service http run on EXAMPLE.COM. After addition of the regexp
support, one section, and therefore thread, will be able to handle rotation of the whole
keytab.
3.4.2 GUI
I am planning to develop the user interface for daemon, simplify its use for the unexperienced
users and add other functionalities to provide easier management of the specified rules and
keytabs.
• Real time monitoring of rotation times and grace periods
• Dialogs for creating and editing sections with regexp context help
• Immediate rotation or deletion of deprecated keys
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As inspired in other linux daemon GUIs, Rotation Daemons interface is planned to be
very lightweight and simple. First brief sketch is shown on figure 3.6.
Figure 3.6: Proposed graphical user interface
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
In this thesis reader was introduced to behavior and principles of Kerberos authentication
system. In first chapter, Kerberos system parts were described as well as its dependency
on keyabs and keytab management. Also many inovative concepts brought up by Ker-
beros have been mentioned. In the following chapter, implementation steps of daemon and
techniques by which it was achieved were explained.
Final daemon application was created with an emphassis on KISS1 priciples, therefore
it provides single functionality, but is aiming for easy and flawless use. Development of
the library was intended to interfere with system as minimum as possible, even when MIT
Kerberos is using files to store client’s tickets. Testing proved, that it is possible rotate
keys in much shorter times than is inteded for its general use without failing or intefering
with system. For future use, it might be also useful and required, to monitor access to
the system value of path to actual Kerberos ticket cache. Although no error involving this
occured in testing procedure, it is possible that this sort of bug will be found after wider
expansion.
As mentioned before, the final daemon is cappable of required tasks with high reliability.
It is aiming to simplify users management of keytabs with objective of higher security.
These factors considered, steps to incorporate it to RedHat Enterprise Linux and FreeIPA
are already being taken, therefore future development is not just considered, but required.
1Keep It Simple, Stupid
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Appendix A
DVD contents
• Directory documentation
Contains bachelor’s thesis in PDF format and LATEXsource codes.
• Directory ipa krot
Contains source codes of daemon in C language.
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Appendix B
Manual
In this appendix, steps to compile application and run the daemon are described.
B.1 Dependencies
The daemon uses wide spectrum of not commonly used libraries, most of them are required
by the Kerberos or the FreeIPA itself, but in case of minimal installation it might not be
present.
• libdb-devel
Provides BerkeleyDB, used in the daemon for storing its actual state.
• libcollection-devel, libini config-devel
Reading ini configuration files and stroring its content to collection data structure.
• libkrb5-devel, libkrb5 crypto
Core libraries for Kerberos V5 an its cryptographic procedures.
• libber-devel
Used to prepare LDAP control data, library provides methods to generate BER code.
• openldap-devel
Providiong methods to control LDAP.
Most of these libraries will be installed as dependencies to freeipa-client.
B.2 Unpacking
Project is packed in .tar.gz format, to get its contents, simple extraction using tar is
required.
$ tar -xzf ipa_krot.tar.gz
Figure B.1: Unpacking application
Following list of files will be extracted:
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• ipa krotlib.h, ipa krotlib.c
Library of functions used by daemon and utility.
• ipa krotd.h, ipa krotd.c
Daemon source codes.
• ipa krot.c Command-line utility source codes.
• ipa conf.ini Example of configuration file.
• Makefile Makefile for compiling the daemon and utility.
• LICENSE.txt Copy of GNU General Public License 3.0
B.3 Compiling
After executing GNU utility make on provided makefile, two executable files will be gener-
ated:
• ipa krot
Utility for single rotation.
• ipa krotd
Daemon for automatic rotation.
After executing ipa krotd, the daemon will start in background and begin to rotate
keytabs using given configuration.
To terminate, one of SIGTERM, SIGQUIT, SIGINT signals must be recieved by the dae-
mon.
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